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Summary
The costs of energy supply disruptions for industrialised economies go well beyond the
economic measures of national accounts. According to different kinds of risks, physical
shortages or price shocks, there are several categories of negative effects. Oil
disruptions have both a direct and an indirect impact, (at global and local levels) and
have a short- and a medium-term horizon. The economic effects of electricity shortages
are also direct and indirect, but the temporal lag is shorter than for oil disruptions. In
this paper, we summarise the different ways an economy is affected by an oil shock or a
power black-out. Oil crises in the past produced high inflation rates, trade and payments
imbalances, high unemployment, and weak business and consumer confidence. The
social costs of electricity shortages have immediate negative results, and relatively
small, indirect effects – depending on the extension of the disruption, the duration, the
availability of advance warning and information. A specific assessment of the social
costs of an electricity shortage remains a research task for the future.
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There is general agreement within international literature about the nature of the costs of 
supply disruptions, affirming that they go well beyond the economic measures of the national 
accounts. Energy use pervades daily life in such a constant and ubiquitous way that it is very 
difficult to distinguish among all the short- and long-term negative effects. 
Energy security and supply disruption 
To assess the social costs resulting from a supply disruption, it is first necessary to have a precise 
definition of what a supply disruption is. It seems useful to start from the definition of energy security: 
energy security is defined in terms of the physical availability of supplies to satisfy demand at a given 
price. So, the security problem involves a quantity risk and a price risk. And it has a long-term and a 
short-term component (a long-term trend of rising prices for energy imports has a different implication 
for an economy than a sudden price hike or price volatility). Thus, a supply disruption occurs when the 
physical availability of the resource falls under some defined threshold (for a ‘sufficient’ length of time) 
or its price overcomes some other threshold or both, with the obvious consequence that the definition of 
disruption becomes quite arbitrary, as it depends on the assumed thresholds. It is also important to 
understand that the social cost of a primary energy-supply crisis tends to be heavily influenced by the 
specific historical setting and the geopolitical situation in which it occurs (IEA, 2001a, p. 76). 
Generally speaking, the social costs of supply disruptions can be classified under the category 
of economic externalities. The social costs of security are those costs that accrue to others in 
the economy, generating a need for governments to step in and take protective measures (IEA, 
2001a). In order to differentiate among the main components of external social costs, it is 
necessary to clearly separate internal (or private) costs from external (social) costs. 
The social costs of energy disruption can be allocated into different categories, based on the 
varying kinds of risks posed, such as a physical oil shortage, a prolonged interruption in 
electric power (quantity risk) or a sudden rise in oil prices (price risk). Usually oil disruptions 
(especially quantity shortages) have both direct and indirect effects, with a short and medium-
term horizon. With regard to power-generating shortages, the economic effects for society are 
also direct and indirect, but the temporal lag is shorter than for oil disruptions. 
Using these characteristics, it is possible to separately analyse the economic impact of oil 
crises and power-generation or distribution interruptions. In any case, a perfect distinction 
between internal and external costs (i.e. private and social costs) is a very difficult task. 
2.  Social costs of oil disruptions 
With regard to oil disruptions, energy security is defined in terms of the physical availability 
of supplies to satisfy demand at a given price. Oil shocks can be split into several categories, 
notably price, quantity and technology (Helm, 2002): 
-  price shocks are the most common; 
-  quantity shocks relate to physical constraints; and 2  
 
-  technology shocks relate to new concepts and ideas, to failures (i.e. the discovery of 
nuclear design faults) or to new constraints (i.e. an unanticipated technical advantage of 
nuclear energy over oil with the discovery of the climate-change problem). 
Thus, the security problem also has a long-term and short-term component: long-term rising 
prices for oil imports have a different implication for an economy than a sudden price hike or 
price volatility. 
Looking at the past, after the main oil crises, OECD countries and the world were stricken by 
high inflation, trade and payments imbalances, high unemployment, and weak business and 
consumer confidence. Generally speaking, an increase in oil prices leads to a transfer of 
income from the importing to the exporting country through a shift in the terms of trade. For 
net oil-importing countries, an increase in oil prices directly reduces real national income 
because spending on oil rises and there is less national income available to spend on other 
goods. For net oil-exporting countries, a price increase directly increases real national income 
through higher export earnings. The boost to economic growth in oil-exporting countries 
provided by higher oil prices is generally less than the loss of economic growth in importing 
countries, such that the net effect on the global economy is negative. 
Oil supply disruptions have occurred rather frequently: over the past half century, there have 
been at least 14 significant disruptions involving a loss of 0.5 mb/d or more of crude oil. Most 
of these disruptions were related to political or military upheavals, especially in the Middle 
East. Since 1973, four major crises – the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the 1978-89 Iranian 
revolution, the 1980 Iran-Iraq war and the 1990-91 Gulf war – resulted in initial shortfalls of 
between 4.0 and 5.6 mb/d. Virtually all past oil disruptions have been short, typically lasting a 
maximum of nine months. 
Based on the most relevant literature on the subject (IEA, 2001a; Toman, 2002), the 
politically-based disruptions can be grouped into two categories: 
-  random shocks, caused by internal unrest in OPEC countries, such as the Iranian 
revolution in 1978-79, the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70 or the Iran-Iraq war and the 1990 
Iraq invasion of Kuwait; and 
-  strategic shocks involving the exercise of market power by Middle Eastern oil producers 
such as the Arab oil embargoes of 1957, 1967 and 1973-74. 









Source: Harks, 2003. 
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Establishing the point at which an oil shortage becomes a crisis is not an easy task. In an 
attempt to identify a reference value for oil price variation and reductions in oil consumption 
based on past shocks (Figure 1 and Table 1), it emerges that a possible minimum value for 
price and consumption variations could be respectively 100% and 4 million barrels per day.
1 
Table 1. World oil supply disruptions 
Dates Supply  disruption  Magnitude of supply 
shortfall (mb/d) 
World oil consumption 
(mb/d) 
Oil price change 
(%) 
Mar. 1951–Oct. 
1954  Iranian fields nationalised  0.7  13.2  12.87
a (cum) 
Nov. 1956–Mar. 
1957  Suez war  2.0  17.5  9.47
a 
Dec. 1966 – Mar. 
1967  Syrian transit fee dispute  0.7  34.3  n.a. 
Jun. 1967 – Aug. 
1967  Six Day War  2.0  40.0  n.a. 
Jul. 1967 – Oct. 
1968  Nigerian civil war  0.5  40.1  n.a. 
May 1970 – Jan. 
1971  Libyan price controversy  1.3  48.0  24.44
a 
Apr. 1971 – Aug. 
1971 
Algerian-French nationalisation 
struggle  0.6 50.2  n.a. 
Mar. 1973 – May 
1973  Lebanese political conflict  0.5  58.2  32.66
a 
Oct. 1973 – Mar. 
1974  October Arab-Israeli war  4.3  58.2 252.98
a 
May 1977  Damage of Saudi oilfield 0.7  62.1 n.a. 
Nov. 1978 – Apr. 
1979  Iranian revolution  5.6  65.1 120.8
a 
Oct. 1980 – Jan. 
1981  Outbreak of Iran-Iraq war  4.1  60.4 18.85
a 
Mar. 1989 – Apr. 
1989  Exxon Valdez accident  <0.5  51.6  16.95
 b 
Apr. 1989 – Jun. 
1989  UK Cormorant Platform  0.5  51.6  n.a. 
Aug. 1990 – Jan. 
1991  Iraqi invasion of Kuwait  4.3  66.3 113.21
 b 
Jun – Jul 2001  Iraqi oil export suspension  2.2  75.4  n.a. 
Dec. 2002  Venezuelan strike  2.7  75.7  18.07
 b 
Notes: 
a Oil price increase on annual basis. 
b Oil price increase on monthly basis. 
Sources: Authors’ elaborations on IEA (2001a), BP (2003) and EconStat (2003). 
                                                           
1 An analysis based on the total value of oil shortfall ignores any evaluation about the relative magnitude of a 
crisis compared with total demand. As an example, during the Gulf war (1991) the percentage of reduction in oil 
supply compared to world demand was much higher, at 9%, than the reduction during the 1979 Iranian 
revolution at 7%. From the analysis of total value, however, opposite results emerge, with a greater magnitude of 
shortfall for the 1979 crisis. 4  
 
2.1 Macroeconomic  effects 
Using these limit values to characterise relevant past crises, various studies have attempted to 
establish whether or not there are linkages between oil shocks (higher oil prices) and reduced 
economic growth rates. At first, it was widely believed that the 1974-75 recession and the 
emergence of ‘stagflation’ – a combination of inflation and rising unemployment – in 
industrialised countries was caused primarily by the oil price increase of 1973-74. But there is 
no general agreement on the magnitude of the negative impact of an oil shock on the whole 
economy. 
In this regard, on one side there are studies such as those in Huntington (1998), where an 
asymmetric relationship has been demonstrated, in that a reduction in oil prices does not 
necessarily lead to noticeable output growth, while an increase can have a negative impact on 
output growth. Furthermore, disruptions in the oil market not only give rise to higher prices, 
but also increase oil-price volatility (Ferderer, 1996). Chaudhuri (2001) recently found that 
nonstationary commodity prices could be attributed to the nonstationarity of oil prices. In 
other words, as real oil prices and real commodity prices are co-integrated, oil shocks have a 
negative impact on economic performance. 
Other studies, concentrated more on the role of fiscal and monetary policy, suggest that 
recessions in the oil-importing countries were less the direct result of higher prices and more 
the consequence of the economic policies adopted to alleviate the price shock (IEA, 2001b). 
In any case, looking at real data, oil-importing countries have experienced significant 
economic effects from oil shocks. 
Highlighting some factors that are widely agreed upon, supply-side shocks appear in the 
economic system as autonomous variations of imported raw material costs, with external 
effects (at the international level) and internal effects (at the national level). 
External, global effects 
The main external  effect of a shock is the income reallocation, between importing and 
exporting countries and also among importing countries. With regard to importing countries, 
an increase in the oil price directly reduces GDP, because the increased expenditure for 
imported oil reduces the income available for other goods and services. Within exporting 
countries, however, an increase of oil price (exported good) directly produces a growth of 
GDP, owing to the augmented revenues derived from exports. Nonetheless, positive GDP 
growth for exporting countries is generally considered to be lower than the reduction of 
growth in importing countries. Therefore, the total effect on the global economy is negative 
(Birol, 1998). Furthermore, income reallocation among importing countries is derived from 
the different capacity of each country to substitute imported energy with other energy carriers 
(or to substitute energy with other inputs). 
Internal, local effects 
The internal effects of a shock are linked to the typical economic policy variables (Pireddu, 
1990), including: 
-  the activity level and the correlated employment rate; 
-  the inflation rate and the correlated income distribution between salaries and profits, 
which are determinants for capital accumulation and competitiveness at the national level; 
and 
-  the trade balance equilibrium and the correlated level of the exchange rate.                                                                                     5 
 
For countries that import oil, an increasing oil price in the global market can be seen to have 
three main (and direct) effects on their economies, which are: 
-  a direct effect on economic activity because more spending will be allocated to energy 
costs; 
-  a financial effect because of the rise of inflation and interest rates; and 
-  a trade effect relating to an increased oil import bill, which worsens the trade balance. 
Apart from losses in GDP and balance of payments, other macroeconomic indirect effects, 
linked to the previous ones, may include the following: 
-  a fall in tax revenues pertaining to rigidities in government expenditure, which can 
produce an increase in the budget deficit and eventually drive interest rates up; 
-  because of the resistance to real declines in wages, an oil price increase typically leads to 
upward pressure on nominal-wage levels; together with reduced demand, wage pressures 
can in turn lead to higher unemployment; these effects are magnified by the swiftness of 
the price increase and inflexibility of the labour market (and could be further increased by 
the impact of higher oil prices on consumer and business confidence); and 
-  a decrease of exports because of the rise of the internal price, which reduces the 
competitiveness of national products. 
Thus, increases in inflation and unemployment rates are the main, macroeconomic features of 
social costs, while other factors such as GDP loss and balance of payments are more difficult 
to allocate among their private and social components. 
A comparison between two oil shocks 
After the 1973 and 1979-80 oil price crises there were various negative effects in terms of GDP and 
balance of payments losses, each representing a substantial terms of trade deterioration for the OECD 
as a whole, equivalent to around 2% of GDP. Because of the rather low price-elasticity of oil in the 
short term, the increase in the net oil-import bill has been very large in both cases, even though total 
oil demand has declined because of lower GDP growth, as a result of oil-price increases. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some differences between the 1973 and the 1979-80 oil 
price shock, because of the different magnitudes of price variation. In the first one, imported oil prices 
increased by 250%, while in the period from the end of 1978 to the end of 1980, imported oil prices 
increased by about 20% (see Table 1). 
Even in the case of the inflation rate, although the two oil price shocks were similar, inflation was 
lower in the second oil shock. Inflation reacted more strongly in 1973 (when the spread of private-
consumption deflator growth rates more than doubled between the second half of 1973 and the first 
half of 1974), than it did in the early 1980s because of the change of monetary policy in many 
countries. 
2.2  Factors affecting the impact of a shock 
The magnitude of the economic costs (private, social or both) of an oil price increase can be 
profoundly affected by several factors. The major factors highlighted by literature (Birol, 
1998; IEA, 2001b; Mitchell, 2002; Pireddu, 1990) are the following: 
-  The main two determinants are obviously the level and the duration of the price increase 
and the quantity of crude oil available on the global market, both of which are directly 
linked to the characteristics of the market. It is particularly important to highlight that the 6 
 
duration of the macroeconomic impact of an oil shocks is generally limited to two years 
after the price change. Thus, it is important to distinguish between a fast and high increase 
and a steady rise in the price of oil. 
-  The response of oil markets to an oil price hike, depending on the characteristics of the 
market, also contribute to determining the level of the economic costs. 
-  Other critical factors relate to the structural characteristics of the economy: first, the 
weight of energy costs on GDP, which is directly linked to the share of energy intensive 
sectors in the industry; second, the flexibility of the energy sector, i.e. its capacity to shift 
from one source to another; and third, the elasticity of internal prices to the price of 
imported oil, as in the short period the negative effects on economic activity could be 
reduced through a greater increase of internal prices (which in an open economy could 
otherwise have negative consequences in the longer term, by reducing the competitiveness 
of the country). 
-  Other country-specific factors can deeply influence the economic effects of an oil price 
increase: the macroeconomic trends acting before and during the oil shock; the economic 
policies applied before the crisis; specific institutional mechanisms, particularly for the 
industrial relationships and the labour market (wage and salary formation); the actual 
increase of energy prices in each country, in relation to the fuel mix, the specific fuel 
consumption and the level of petroleum-products taxation; and the response capacity of 
the energy system, in terms of industrial and institutional flexibility. 
-  Finally, the social costs of energy shocks are obviously affected by the specific historical 
and geopolitical context. 
The above remarks show that, as stressed in many recent contributions, the impact of oil price 
shocks on the macroeconomy can be accentuated by the economic and energy-policy response 
to a combination of higher inflation, higher unemployment, lower exchange rates and lower 
real output. In particular, highly contractionary monetary and fiscal policies to contain 
inflationary pressures could exacerbate the effects on recessionary income and unemployment 
(Birol, 1998). Thus, as government policy can influence the overall impact on the economy 
over the longer term, even if it cannot eliminate such adverse impacts as those described 
above, it should operate to minimise them. To highlight just one critical factor in the 
effectiveness of the policy response, from experience it seems necessary to limit the spread of 
inflation across the whole economy. In the short term, the higher cost of imported energy 
could be faced either by trying to protect the activity level or by limiting the inflation rate. 
Economic theory shows that if the economic structure tends to be affected by a wage-price 
spiral, policy measures to reduce the cost of an oil shock could become less effective. 
3.  Some quantitative estimates 
Although the general mechanism by which oil prices affect economic performance is 
generally well understood, the precise dynamics and magnitude of these effects – especially 
adjustments to changes in the terms of trade – are uncertain. Quantitative estimates of the 
overall macroeconomic damage caused by past oil-price shocks and the gains from the 1986 
price collapse to the economies of oil-importing countries vary substantially. This is partly a 
result of differences in the models used to examine the issue. Nevertheless, the effects were 
certainly significant: economic growth fell sharply in most oil-importing countries in the two 
years following the price hikes of 1973-74 and 1979-80. The impact of the first oil shock was 
undoubtedly accentuated by inappropriate policy responses. Conversely, economic growth in 
importing countries was boosted by the fall in prices in 1986, with the full economic impact                                                                                     7 
 
becoming apparent in 1987-88. Looking at the GDP growth rate compared to the real oil price 
trend (net of GDP-deflator rate) in the European Union, a general correlation between higher 
oil prices and a lower GDP growth rate with a one or two-year lag is quite clear (Figure 2). 









Sources: Authors’ elaborations on data from the World Bank (GDP growth rate) and EconStat (oil price). 
A general assessment of the magnitude of GDP loss could be built by analysing the GDP 
growth-rate variation after the three main oil crises. After any crisis a negative impact on 
GDP growth seems evident. As a matter of fact, during last forty years the EU GDP growth 
rate was negative only twice: in 1975 and in 1993. In both cases it happened with a one or 
two-year time lag after an oil price shock. In view of these results, even if the recession after 
the first oil shock was exacerbated by fiscal and monetary policies in oil importing countries, 
a negative influence on GDP is evident in all the crises (Table 2). 
3.1  Negative effects on society: inflation and unemployment 
Other negative effects on economic performance, with a more direct impact in terms of social 
costs could be seen in trends in the inflation rate and unemployment (see Table 2 and Figure 
3). These two factors directly affect governments and citizens, through higher public 
expenditures on welfare measures such as increasing subsidies for unemployment and 
reduced market power for consumers. Because of the inelasticity of oil demand, especially in 
the transport sector, lower-income households could pay a big bill for oil price shocks. 


































































































































) Crude Oil Price
EU Unemployment rate8 
 
Table 2. Impact of oil shocks on the main economic factors, EU 1970-2002 
Year   Change of real price 
of imported crude (%) 








Balance of Payments 
(current $ billion) 
1970 -5.65  10.57  4.83  4.98  -  - 
1971 19.48  4.47  3.73  6.28  -  5.83 
1972 7.21  6.82  4.47  6.57  -  0.85 
1973 24.76  6.83  5.77  9.24  -  -1.80 
1974 217.19  -6.65  1.86  15.11  -  -7.02 
1975 -8.74  -4.89  -0.63  13.98  -  5.74 
1976 1.48  6.5  4.60  12.21  -  -9.83 
1977 0.88  -1.67  2.57  12.33  -  13.55 
1978 -4.98  4.22  2.97  9.19  -  24.94 
1979 98.39  2.52  3.59  10.38  -  -27.33 
1980 4.70  -7.2  1.34  13.13  5.45  -35.71 
1981 -13.00  -6.41  0.23  12.93  7.07  26.03 
1982 -12.74  -5.04  0.92  11.67  8.11  10.92 
1983 -12.23  -2.59  1.88  9.78  9.10  14.83 
1984 -6.60  0.66  2.51  9.05  9.58  8.44 
1985 -5.22  -1.29  2.48  7.23  9.59  11.42 
1986 -48.85  3.68  2.73  4.88  9.42  37.37 
1987 23.59  0  2.70  4.06  8.98  -10.47 
1988 -21.99  1.35  4.17  4.33  8.41  -23.61 
1989 16.12  0.91  3.52  5.7  7.69  -19.41 
1990 24.12  1.87  2.57  6.53  7.20  0.21 
1991 -19.18  2.35  1.43  5.71  7.63  -32.43 
1992 -6.27  1.54  1.26  4.66  8.51  19.07 
1993 -14.42  -0.63  -0.41  4.02  9.99  80.12 
1994 -8.75  0.06  2.77  3.3  10.24  19.14 
1995 4.58  1.28  2.38  3.04  9.74  36.85 
1996 17.71  1.82  1.59  2.46  9.83  28.37 
1997 -9.36  1.05  2.50  1.98  9.23  6.68 
1998 -33.16  1.79  2.90  1.78  8.53  -18.43 
1999 36.25  0.32  2.67  1.48  7.54  -66.49 
2000 53.58  -0.7  3.45  2.8  7.21  -52.40 
2001 -16.86  1.22  1.53  2.97  -  49.13 
2002 0.09  -0.93  0.88  2.49  -  -94.88 
Sources: Authors’ elaborations on data from the World Bank and BP. 
Historical data show that oil shocks have different effects in terms of inflation and 
unemployment. Inflation rates have a sudden response to an oil price increase because of the 
direct market-transmission mechanism. Conversely, an increase in the unemployment rate is 
the result of an indirect mechanism, owing to the rigidity of the EU’s nominal wages in the 
labour market, with possible lags (one or two years) after the oil shock: wage pressure and a 
diminishing GDP growth rate tend to lead to higher unemployment only in successive 
periods. In any case, such negative results in terms of increasing unemployment should take 
into account a typical medium-term economic cycle and other structural factors. Looking at                                                                 9 
 
Figure 3, it can be noted that negative effects after 1991 appear higher than after 1981, while 
increases in both the inflation rate and in the price of oil have been far less. 
3.2  A tool for quantitative assessments of past oil crises 
In order to show the different effects of past oil shocks and to develop an analytical tool to 
evaluate supply disruption scenarios, it is useful to analyse the elasticity of oil demand with 
respect to the price of crude oil, which occurred in OECD countries during previous oil crises, 
with a focus on the EU (Birol, 1998). In Table 3, section (a) compares the percentage of oil 
consumption variation while (b) and (c) relate this change to variations in economic activity 
and real crude oil prices. Finally, the implicit price elasticities for the assumption of unitary-
income elasticities have been derived in section (d). 
Table 3. Effects of oil price changes on oil demand 
  1973-75  1979-82  1985-88 1989-91 1996-98  1998-2000 
(a) Change of oil consumption (%)      
OECD  North  America  -4.26  -11.61  9.54 -1.45 3.95 3.9% 
OECD  Europe  -9.84  -10.43  5.43 1.72 3.07  -0.3% 
OECD Pacific  -7.97  -12.51  8.54  5.52  -3.88  1.0% 
European  Union  -11.21  -10.96  5.08 1.87 2.86  -0.4% 
(b) Change of GDP constant (%)        
OECD North America  0.03  6.62  10.88  1.74  9.06  8.7% 
OECD  Europe  1.21  5.42  9.79 4.50 5.61 6.1% 
OECD Pacific  2.00  11.28  14.28  4.94  1.30  3.3% 
European  Union  1.22  5.22  9.90 2.57 5.47 6.2% 
(c) Change of real price of imported crude (%)     
OECD North America  189.45  80.72  -50.68  24.12  -39.41  109.2% 
OECD Europe  189.45  80.72  -50.68  24.12  -39.41  109.2% 
OECD Pacific  189.45  80.72  -50.68  24.12  -39.41  109.2% 
European Union  189.45  80.72  -50.68  24.12  -39.41  109.2% 
(d) Oil price elasticities (a-b)/c        
OECD  North  America  -0.02  -0.23  0.03 -0.13 0.13 -0.04 
OECD  Europe  -0.06  -0.20  0.09 -0.12 0.06 -0.06 
OECD  Pacific  -0.05  -0.29  0.11 0.02 0.13 -0.02 
European  Union  -0.07  -0.20  0.10 -0.03 0.07 -0.06 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on data from Birol (1998a) the World Bank and EconStats. 
Computed price elasticities (the last rows on Table 3) underline the asymmetry between the 
demand reactions experienced over the previous price increases and the one experienced over 
the past price decline. Comparing price elasticities obtained from the high price crisis with 
those obtained from the low price periods, it is clear that the effects are opposite. During the 
latter, price elasticities are always positive, while in the former they are always negative. So 
the dynamic pattern of energy demand appears to be asymmetrical with respect to the sign of 
a change in oil prices, creating a larger demand adjustment than a comparable price decline.  10 
 
Different reasons, such as the irreversibility of technological improvement, energy 
conservation policies of the OECD governments, asymmetrical depreciation and transaction 
costs associated with conservation programmes may explain this asymmetrical evolution. 
Moreover, consumers may have an expectation that the oil prices will increase again. If 
consumers expect higher fuel prices in the (not too distant) future and if adjustment is costly, 
then it may not be ‘advisable’ to opt for the short-term opportunities offered by the low price. 
The greatest negative impact on the economy was produced by the first oil shock, when the 
energy systems were characterised by a high rigidity of demand. In such a context, the 
ineffective policies implemented by the importing countries exacerbated the negative effects. 
Indeed, the elasticity of oil demand was much higher during the second crisis (1979-82), 
when the reduction of oil consumption was similar to the previous one (-11%), while the price 
rise was much less. Considering the general changes that occurred in the second crisis, higher 
price elasticities could explain the reduced negative impact in terms of GDP losses, because 
of higher reductions in oil consumption, and consequently, the reduced negative effect on the 
economic system. 
Interesting results emerged during the following crisis, where the elasticity of demand was 
again lower. An explanation for this low elasticity can be found in the reduced use of fuel oil 
in electricity generation, while oil use is more and more concentrated in the transport sector, 
where demand is rigid and fuel substitutability is difficult. Nevertheless, the third crisis 
(1989-1992) was characterised by a slower increase in oil prices, owing to the utilisation of 
oil stocks within OECD countries, so that the percentage change in oil consumption was not 
negative (apart from North America), and at the same time the GDP growth was even positive 
and higher than the period 1979-82. Further, during the first Gulf war, the rigidity of demand 
is partially explained by the utilisation of oil stocks, which were quickly able to give the 
market enough oil to offset the negative effects of the reductions in oil supplied by exporting 
countries (Peters, 2003). 
In conclusion, among the main factors that influence the economic impact of a crisis, the 
amount of oil reserves available at the national level and import dependence have to be 
included: high oil reserves and low import dependence can produce a significant reduction of 
the negative economic impact of an oil shock (Razavi, 1997). 
Finally, the positive effects of oil price reductions for importing countries can be evaluated by 
considering the positive elasticity of demand and the high GDP growth rate during the periods 
1985-88 and 1996-98. In both cases, the positive elasticity of demand indicates that oil 
consumption grows less than GDP. These data show that a sharp and substantial variation of 
oil price will probably reduce global income: as the price reduction is not followed by a 
strong increase in oil demand by importing countries, there will certainly be a loss for 
exporting countries, probably higher than the gain obtained by importing countries. 
3.3  Some estimates of GDP loss 
An estimation of GDP elasticity with respect to oil price could be a simple tool to evaluate the 
negative economic impact of an oil crisis (Razavi, 1997), but within the international 
literature there are also some supply/demand models capable of generating forecasts of near-
term price movements (weeks or months ahead) or simulating supply disruptions. These 
models are helpful in predicting price responses to supply crisis, by determining the baseline 
around which prices will fluctuate, according to expectation and speculative factors. For 
example, DRI/McGraw-Hill maintains a large-scale econometric model of the world spot oil                                                                                    11 
 
market and produces regular price forecasts and simulations (IEA, 2001a). The US 
Department of Energy (DOE) also maintains a spreadsheet model designed explicitly to 
predict oil price and demand responses in the event of a major disruption (IEA, 2001a). 
Based on the DRI model, a sudden cut in oil production of around 1 mb/d leads 
approximately to an average increase in crude oil price of $1.50-$2.00 per barrel within about 
three months, assuming prices in the $15-$20 per barrel range. In the DOE model, prices are 
more sensitive to supply losses. Each 1 mb/d of lost supply increases spot crude oil prices by 
$3.50-$4.00 per barrel in the first quarter and progressively less for the second and third 
quarters. 
The lack of a clear correlation between initial supply losses and the resulting oil price 
increases occurs, because during past crises these losses were in most instances rapidly offset 
by production increases in countries not affected by the crises (IEA, 2001b). 
Other studies have focused on analysing the economic impact of oil price increases. For 
instance, one of the official EU documents about security of oil supply has estimates that an 
increase of $10 in the price of a barrel of crude oil is likely to reduce economic growth in the 
industrialised countries by around 0.5%. Another study produced by the International 
Monetary Found estimates that a $10 per barrel increase in the oil price, if sustained for a 
year, reduces global GDP by 0.6% – ignoring the secondary effects on confidence, stock 
markets and policy responses (EU, 2002). 
4.  Social costs of electricity shortages 
The social costs of energy disruptions related to electricity shortages are easier to distinguish 
as a result of their immediate negative impact and relatively small, indirect and successive 
effects. Generally, the social costs of an electricity disruption depend on the quality and 
composition of various factors: 
-  the extension of the disruption in terms of the area affected (and the demographic density 
of the territory); 
-  the existence of alternative energy sources that could or could not replace the missing 
energy (i.e. the solar energy disposals in a small area in New York guaranteed their 
inhabitants a continuous energy flow during the last disruption on 14 August 2003); 
-  the duration and the continuity of the disruption; 
-  the specific time of day at which the disruption occurred; 
-  the season, given that climate is a very important factor for both the magnitude of the 
disruption and the scale of consequences (usually summer black-outs are more serious due 
to air conditioning); and 
-  the availability of advance warning and information. 
In order to evaluate all the public and governmental sectors affected by an energy shortage, it 
is useful to overview what happened during previous black-outs in North America and in 
Europe. A possible list of social costs that could occur after an energy disruption is below. 
1. Expenditure for military, police and emergence actions (excluding health) 
-  Costs of activating a counter-terrorism response, because of the lack of an immediate 
warning about the black-out 
-  Costs of emergency requests to police and public order forces (arrests, riots) 
-  Costs of emergencies for fire workers (i.e. fires, elevators, closing doors, subway, etc.) 12 
 
2. Expenditures for public transport 
-  Costs to public railways owing to interruption include reduced revenues, increased 
emergencies, delays (affecting both the public transport system and consumers) and 
increased risks of accidents (i.e. computer interruptions in the traffic planning-system) 
-  Costs of subway interruptions include reduced revenues, increased emergencies, increased 
risk of accidents, delays (affecting both the public transport system and consumers) 
-  Costs of flights, increased emergencies, delays (effects on consumers) increased risk of 
accidents 
3. Health care expenditures 
-  Immediate costs to the health care infrastructure (hospitals, emergencies, laboratories) 
such as emergency surgery, emergency medical-service calls, loss of medicines, organs, 
blood and analysis (and experiments) owing to reduced refrigerating capacity (prolonged 
shortage) 
-  Post black-out health expenditures (relating to violence, injuries as a result of fires, food 
poisoning, panic attacks and uncomfortable temperatures) 
4. Sanitation and waste disposals 
-  Immediate costs for the interruption in sanitation services and waste disposal, as well as 
recycling systems or composting/incinerator disposals 
-  Further costs owing to excessive waste accumulation 
-  Possible sanitary costs relating to the reduced capacity of wastewater treatment facilities 
5. Other public services 
-  Costs relating to the interruption of classes in public schools and universities 
-  Food losses (reduced refrigeration capacity) throughout public facilities 
-  Social costs for illness (reduced work capacity) 
-  Costs pertaining to the interruption of other public administrative services (councils, 
assistance, etc.) 
-  Loss of museum revenues 
-  Political ‘fallout’ 
6. Human life values 
-  Costs relating to mortalities  
-  Costs as a result of illness 
-  Losses of leisure time, personal injury, fear and panic 
Additionally, all of the sectors described above could face further high costs (Rios et al., 
1999), which are linked to: 
-  idle but paid-for resources such as labour or capital 
-  equipment damage 
-  process-restart costs 
-  spoilage of resources 
-  utility restoration costs 
In order to analyse the links between the direct and indirect effects of energy disruptions, a 
classic example could be the negative impact of electricity shortages on farmers and                                                                                     13 
 
consequently on consumers. In this case, however, the time lag of the consequences could be 
longer, even up to one year. The example taken from US experience can be perfectly adapted 
to the situation in the EU, owing to the high subsidies that characterise the agricultural sector 
in the two regions. The economic losses borne by farmers in terms of reduced income are 
partly replaced by public subsidies, changing the private cost (to farmers) into a social cost 
(taxes for citizens). 
Looking at disruptions of energy supply to agriculture of even short durations, the effects on 
farmers could be a substantial reduction or even a complete loss of an entire growing season 
(such as a shortage of electricity to pump water during a drought season or to milk cows, etc.). 
Following studies from the US National Council of Farmer Cooperatives (NCFC) and the US 
Agriculture Department, agriculture and the rest of the rural sector are typically at the end of 
the energy distribution chain, with fewer alternative supply options and greater vulnerability 
to disruptions. An initial (direct) effect could be the shortage of energy-dependent services 
(i.e. irrigation or milking cows) and a consequent loss of crops. Another (indirect) effect 
depends on energy price increases. In the event of energy price spikes, farmers, as price-takers 
for their commodity, are unable to pass price increases for energy or fertilizer on to the 
consumer, and therefore receive an even lower return for their products. 
The US Department of Agriculture recently estimated that the price increases for energy 
inputs and fertilizer owing to energy disruptions during the past few months in California – if 
projected into the year – could result in a 1-2% increase in total costs of production. This may 
not seem significant, but it becomes a serious matter when considering that this cost increase 
would translate into a one-third decrease in net farm cash-income.   14 
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